We examine an oligopoly model of advertising competition where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitors' advertising decisions. A differential game model is developed and used to derive the closed-loop Nash equilibrium under symmetric as well as asymmetric competition. We obtain explicit solutions under certain plausible conditions, and discuss the effects of an increase in the number of competing firms on advertising expenditure, market share and profitability.
Introduction
Many industries are characterized by firms competing for market share primarily on the basis of advertising. The markets for cola drinks, beer and cigarettes are some examples that have been studied in the literature (Erickson 1992, Fruchter and Kalish 1997) . Each firm's advertising acts to increase its market share while the competitors' advertising acts to reduce its market share. Owing to the carry-over dynamics of advertising, an analytical solution in continuous time typically starts by modeling the competitive interaction as a differential game, where each firm tries to increase its profit while taking into consideration the response of its competitors. Whereas elements of the marketing environment such as carry-over dynamics, competition, competitive and non-competitive decay have been described by individual models, understanding optimal advertising policies in differential games is hindered by the difficulty in obtaining explicit solutions.
Despite this difficulty, a few intrepid researchers have examined the important issue of dynamic advertising competition involving more than two firms. Teng and Thompson (1983) and Dockner and Jorgensen (1992) develop oligopoly models where sales rather than market share is the dependent variable and competitive advertising affects sales indirectly by its effect on market saturation. These models are based on the innovation diffusion dynamics in which the market reaches saturation after some time. They show that advertising should decrease over time, caused possibly by the saturation effect. Using an advertising model based on goodwill accumulation, Fershtman (1984) studied oligopoly competition and obtained the following results: (i) Firms with lower production costs obtain larger market share. (ii) As the number of firms increases, individual firms' equilibrium advertising decreases, except possibly for the market share leader. (iii) If all firms are identical, the firms' equilibrium advertising tends to decrease with interest rate, depreciation rate, and production cost increases. We will examine whether these results continue to hold in our setting, and find that whereas some hold, others do not. Erickson (1995 Erickson ( , 2003 uses the method of dynamic conjectural variations to study oligopoly markets. For the case where the discount rate is zero, and for three symmetric competitors, Erickson (2003, p.103 ) obtains a simple solution for the advertising rate, showing that it increases with the profit margin and the conjectured lack of response of the competitor, and it decreases with the concavity of the market shares response to advertising. We will examine the effects of margin and competitive response in our setting. Fruchter (1999) extends the closed-loop duopoly analysis of Fruchter and Kalish (1987) to an oligopoly, and demonstrates that treating an oligopoly as a two-player game by aggregating all the rival firms results in suboptimal advertising. Particularly for the papers that use closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions, simulations are needed to understand the effect of parameter changes, whereas in our model, at least for symmetric firms, explicit solutions are obtained that can be analytically handled.
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In this paper we propose to extend the work of Sethi (1983) to an oligopoly. In the original paper, Sethi (1983) proposed a stochastic model of advertising dynamics for a monopoly that admitted explicit solutions. As we shall see, the extension is appropriate only when there is not too great an asymmetry between firms. Nevertheless, it is valuable in providing, for the first time, explicit closed-loop solutions for the oligopoly case. We will solve an infinite horizon, 2 Differential games can be solved using either open-loop or closed-loop solution concepts. In the open-loop solution, competing firms decide at inception what their advertising expenditures will be over the planning horizon. The closed-loop solution envisages that competing firms decide upon their advertising response given the current state. Whereas the latter concept, being time consistent, is intuitively more appealing, is robust, provides a better fit to empirical data and satisfies subgame perfection, it is more difficult to compute than an open-loop solution (e.g., Chintagunta 1993 , Erickson 1995 , 1992 , Feichtinger et. al 1994 , Fruchter and Kalish 1997 . Typically, resort must be made to numerical methods of solution.
differential game model using the closed-loop Nash equilibrium concept to obtain insights into the effects of an increase in the number of competing firms on advertising expenditure, market share and profitability.
The rest of the paper is divided into sections dealing with the Sethi model that provides the conceptual underpinnings for the present effort, the description of the proposed model, the analysis for symmetric and asymmetric firms, and finally, the conclusions.
The Sethi Model and its Extensions
The original Sethi model is stochastic but, for our purposes, the deterministic version given by
is relevant, where ( ) x t is the sales rate (expressed as a fraction of the total market) at time t , ( ) u t is the advertising expenditure rate, ρ is a response constant and δ is a market share decay constant. The parameter ρ may be conceptualized as brand strength, which determines the effectiveness of advertising, while δ determines the rate at which consumers are lost due to product obsolescence, forgetting, etc. The formulation, like the classical Vidale-Wolfe (1957) model, has the desirable properties that market share has a concave response to advertising and there is a saturation level (Little 1979) . Sorger (1989) combined the Sethi model with the Lanchester framework to obtain
2 2 1 1 0
where ( ) x t and ( ) y t represent the market shares of the two firms, whose parameters and decision variables are indexed 1 and 2, respectively. Note that ( ) ( ) 1 x t y t + = . Sorger describes some appealing characteristics of the model in detail, noting that it is compatible with word-ofmouth and nonlinear effects, and provides a comparison with other dynamics used in the advertising scheduling literature. Moreover, Chintagunta and Jain (1995) have provided empirical support for the Sethi model by testing Sorger's specification using data from the pharmaceuticals, soft drinks, beer and detergent industries, and find it to be appropriate. Prasad and Sethi (2003) consider a duopoly extension of the Sethi model including the stochastic noise. The deterministic part of their dynamics differs from Sorger's model in having a churn parameter δ , and is given by 
They note that churn is caused by non-competitive factors such as product obsolescence, forgetting, lack of market differentiation, lack of information, variety seeking and brand switching behavior. It acts to equalize market shares of the competing firms.
In all these cases, the objective for firm i is given by
e m x t c u t dt
where i c is a cost parameter and i V is the profit or value function.
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These models, and several others such as Deal (1979) , Deal, Sethi and Thompson (1979) , Erickson (1992) , Horsky and Mate (1988) , provide excellent insight into advertising spending under monopoly and duopolistic competition. This literature is surveyed by Ericsson (2003) , Feichtinger, Hartl and Sethi (1994) , Jorgensen (1982 ) Jorgensen and Zaccour (2004 ), and Sethi (1977 . However, researchers have been concerned about the paucity of results for the general nfirm oligopoly. Indeed, with the notable exception of Ericsson (2003), there have been few attempts to study even a triopoly due to the intractability of the analysis. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that many industries have more than two competitors.
Model
We consider an n -firm oligopoly market in a mature product category so that the total sales of the category are relatively stable. Let ( ) i x t denote the market share of firm i , {1, 2,.., } i n ∈ ≡ at time t and 2 n ≥ . We will use notation listed in Table 1. <Insert Table 1 here> Firm i 's objective is to maximize its long-run, discounted profits:
This is subject to the dynamics given by , Gain from competitors Market share churn Loss to competitors 1 1 1 ( )
The proposed dynamics is the oligopoly version of the Sethi model where advertising influences non-adopters of the product to purchase the advertised brand, and churn acts to equalize competitors' market shares. When the churn term is omitted, the dynamics is also identical to Sorger (1989) for the duopoly case, which is desirable since the Sorger model has been empirically validated by Chintagunta and Jain (1995) . As noted by Sorger (1989) , the dynamics has additional desirable properties such as resembling the basic Vidale-Wolfe and
Lanchester models and having word-of mouth effects. The latter is due to the expansion
− , where the last term is interpreted as an interaction between consumers. In equilibrium, the dynamics resembles an excess advertising model.
It is required that market shares should not become negative. We will obtain a sufficient condition to ensure that this constraint is met given equilibrium advertising strategies. The analysis thus applies to oligopoly markets where this condition is met. There is also a logical consistency requirement that the market shares should sum to one, i.e.,
implying that 0
This imposes the restriction on the parameters
Equation (8) can be written after inserting (10) as
Analysis
The analysis is performed by obtaining and solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for each firm. We first state two assumptions, where the conditions for the assumptions to hold will be determined in later sections.
Assumption A1: The optimal advertising control i u is nonzero and positive for all firms.
An examination of the objective function shows that it is quadratic in the control variable and hence negative advertising expenditures are automatically excluded. This is because the cost term 2 i i c u is still positive when i u is negative. However, there may be cases where advertising is zero so we first examine the case where it is nonzero.
Assumption A2: The market share of each firm is bounded between 0 and 1.
It will be shown that the nature of the dynamics ensures that market share never exceeds 1. We will derive the situations for market shares to remain nonnegative given optimal advertising decisions in a later section. This approach is preferable to constraining the market shares ex ante since the constrained maximization problem is intractable to solve.
In Theorem 1 below, we provide the Nash Equilibrium solution of the advertising game.
(Proofs are in the Appendix).
Theorem 1: For the differential game given by equations (7) and (11), when (A1) and (A2) hold, the optimal feedback advertising for firm i is given by 1 * 2 ( 1)
and the value function is 0 1
where the unknown parameters are determined from the relations
The noteworthy aspect here is that the HJB equations could be solved to yield a relatively simple optimal control, which is a consequence of the linear value function solution.
Illustration
To illustrate the application of Theorem 1, we examine the case of a triopoly. To simplify the exposition, we restrict the asymmetry to one firm, keeping the remaining symmetric. Thus, 
We then apply Theorem 1. The advertising decisions are
For the 7 unknown parameters 1 1 1 , , , , , α β γ α β γ and η , seven equations are obtained: 
Equilibrium market shares
Substituting the optimal advertising control expression from Theorem 1 into the original dynamics, we get (1 )
In equilibrium, 0 i dx dt = , and we can solve for the steady state market shares. ( 1)
( 1)
(c) The equilibrium market share of the i th firm is given by the formula
Using this formula for a duopoly, the steady state market shares are given by the
which is the result obtained in Prasad and Sethi (2003) . For a triopoly, the expressions are 
Apparently, the attraction model result of equilibrium market share being of the form "us/(us+them)", which falls out from several Lanchester type dynamics, does not hold when there are more than two firms, that is, we did not obtain /
Note that if the i B 's are equal for all firms, then each firm gets an equal 1/ n market share, which is decreasing in the number of firms in the industry.
Illustration
We consider the simplified case of a four-firm oligopoly and use Theorem 2(a,b) to obtain market share trajectories and the steady state using numerical simulations. We then verify the steady state market shares against Theorem 2(c).
To obtain the trajectory, one may apply numerical methods of solving the system of linear differential equations in Theorem 2(a), such as the classical Runge-Kutta method.
However, since we have a solution to the system of equations, we show how it may be directly applied. We begin by assuming that the i B parameters for the industry are known, which may be from a study of historical data or expert judgment. 
The results are plotted in Figure 1 . 
Applicability
We now consider the implications of Assumptions (A1) and (A2) on the applicability of the results. Assumption (A1) requires that the firm should commit strictly positive advertising at all times as its optimal strategy. If the expression for * i u is positive, then it would appear that this condition has been met. In particular, we can verify numerically that this condition is met given the parameters for the market. Those parameters may in turn be determined by managerial judgment or through estimation on historical advertising-sales data. In the case of symmetric firms, we can verify this condition analytically, which we shall do in the next section.
However, it is not sufficient to show only that the expression for * i u is positive. One must also calculate the value function for the firm and show that it is positive as well. Else, the firm is guaranteed to make a strictly positive profit by having zero advertising expenditure. We shall also examine this condition analytically for symmetric firms.
By Assumption (A2) stated above, the model results will apply to industries where the industry parameters are such that the market share for no firm should be less than 0 or greater than 1 in equilibrium. We derive the sufficient condition for this applicability condition in this section. From the previous section, the dynamics along an optimal path are given by
For the market share of firm i to be less than 1, the required condition is that 0
An examination of (30) shows that this condition is always satisfied.
For the market share to be greater than 0, the required condition is that increases. Hence, we cannot study extremely asymmetric markets. However, with symmetric firms, the requirement is always satisfied.
Applicability is increased if we do not enforce that market shares should always be nonnegative, but instead adopt the less stringent condition that steady state market shares should be non-negative. That condition is given by
It can be verified that if (31) holds, then (32) must also hold.
Symmetric firms
We will solve for the unknown parameters in the case when firms are symmetric, i.e., The expression for 2 n = corresponds to the symmetric duopoly solution of Prasad and Sethi (2003) , where the β , c and δ parameters in that paper correspond to ( ) β γ − , c and / 2 δ , respectively, in this paper. From direct observation of Theorem 4(b, c), the following comparative statics can be noted:
Note in particular that the firm's advertising is increasing with the number of firms in the industry. While this is in contrast to the result of Fershtman (1984) , the results for the interest rate, depreciation rate and production cost (captured by the margin) are consistent. The total industry advertising * nu is also increasing with the number of firms. This leads to the consideration of whether Assumption (A1) will hold at all times or not. One can do the calculations in two ways. The first is to calculate α γ + and examine the value function for a firm to see whether it becomes negative. We find that The second calculation is simpler. We write the total industry profit as ( )
We have shown that 0 β γ − > , but the first term can become negative with an increase in the number of firms showing that the industry can sustain only a limited number * n of firms before zero advertising becomes an optimal strategy for at least a subset of firms. The sustainable number is determined by setting
This condition is less stringent than the requirement that an individual firm's value function be positive, but it has the benefit of applying to an existing configuration of firms rather than the earlier sequential entry description.
We rephrase this condition as 
This is clearly satisfied for duopoly and triopoly, but with more firms, the first term becomes negative, while the second is always positive. Hence, numerical investigation is required. Figure   2 shows the plot of the function in equation (41) If it is the case that we start with the number of firms in the industry that is larger than the sustainable number, then a shakeout will occur. Some firms will do no advertising and allow their market share to decline to zero thereby harvesting the profits from their initial market share.
Presumably, when the market share has declined to zero, these firms will exit the market, thus reducing the number of firms until it is at or below the sustainable number. Hence, in practice, the constraint that the number of firms should be below * n does not appear to be a serious one.
Conclusions
The annual advertising expenditure is over $100 billion for firms in the US alone, but it is often spent in a suboptimal manner (Aaker and Carmen 1982) . Analysis of optimal advertising expenditures in an oligopoly market is important, but few attempts have been made in this regard due to the complexity of the modeling. We employ a fruitful avenue of research based on the Sethi model that allows for greater tractability in analysis, due to a linear form of the value function that results from using it. By doing so, we extend the duopoly analysis of Sorger (1989) and Sethi and Prasad (2003) to n-firms.
In the general case, and subject to two assumptions on the domain of applicability of the model, we obtain the closed-loop equilibrium advertising strategies, and show that advertising should be proportional to the combined competitors' market shares. The market shares in equilibrium are given by a simple expression based on the strengths of the different brands.
In the case of a symmetric oligopoly market, we are able to obtain an explicit closed-loop solution for the advertising expenditures of all firms. The comparative statics in this case agree with the results of Fershtman (1984) in a goodwill based model of advertising in oligopoly markets, namely, if all firms are identical, the firms' equilibrium advertising decreases with interest rate and production cost increases. We are also in agreement with Erickson's (2003) result for triopoly markets, namely, advertising increases with the profit margin. In contrast with
Fershtman, we find that advertising increases as the number of firms increases. As a consequence, we also find that the value function decreases with an increase in the number of firms. However, there is a limit to the number of firms with positive advertising that can be accommodated by the industry.
as in Horsky and Mate (1988) and Prasad and Sethi (2003) . The difficulty there will be the intractability caused by constraining the market shares to lie between 0 and 1. Sales expansion effects of advertising models such as this have also been an area of investigation; see, e.g., Erickson (1985) and Fruchter (1999) . Finally, the results obtained here could be tested using industry data.
Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for firm i is given by
This may be rewritten as
We obtain the optimal feedback controls 1 * max{0, } 2 ( 1)
Anticipating that the controls will be shown to be positive, we insert these controls into the HJB equations to obtain for firm i , (1 ) 4 ( 1)
To solve these n simultaneous partial differential equations, we use the following linear value functions, observing that they satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi equations, 0 1
Thus, there are a total of 1 n + unknown parameters for each of the n firms. To determine these parameters, we insert equation (A5) 
(1 ) 2 ( 1)
Equating powers of (1 )
These 1 n + relationships are obtained i ∀ ∈ ¡ , resulting in ( 1) n n + equations to be solved for the ( 1) n n + unknown coefficients.
Proof of Theorem 2
Part (a): We can write equation (21) as
where we defined 
(1 )( ) 
where I is the identity matrix, 1 is a column vector of 1's, and 
To obtain a sufficient condition, we will consider the most pessimistic condition.
Renumber the firms such that 1 2 ... 
We express the unknowns in terms of β γ − . Multiplying (C2) by 2, and (C3) by 1 n − and adding them, we get n*
